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Abstract
This paper proposes a method to design an optimal dynamic contract between a principal
and an agent, who has the authority to control both the principal’s revenue and an engineered
system. The key characteristic of our problem setting is that the principal has very limited
information: the principal has no capability to monitor the agent’s control or the state of the
engineered system. The agent has perfect observations. With this asymmetry of information,
we show that the principal can induce the agent to control both the revenue and the system
processes in a way that maximizes the principal’s utility, if the principal offers appropriate
real-time and end-time compensation. We reformulate the dynamic contract design problem
as a stochastic optimal control of both the engineered system and the agent’s future expected
payoff, which can be numerically solved using an associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
The performance and usefulness of the proposed contract are demonstrated with an indirect
load control problem.
1 Introduction
Designing contracts and incentives is an important problem in economics and engineering. Eco-
nomics studies on the principal-agent problem analyze how a contract between a principal (e.g., a
company) and an agent (e.g., a worker) can be designed in an uncertain environment [1]. Contract
design problems have also been investigated to incentivize agents in engineered infrastructure, such
as electric power systems, to improve its operation and regulation [2, 3].
Dynamic contract studies in economics and finance primarily concern the principal’s (stochastic)
revenue stream as a dynamic system of interest and study how to design compensation schemes to
motivate the agent to control the revenue process in a way that maximizes the principal’s profit
[4, 5]. In engineering, on the other hand, the dynamic contracts can also be used to manage the
agent’s control of an engineered system. For example, an electricity utility company may want to
make a (dynamic) contract with a building manager who has the authority to control the indoor
temperature of a building. The utility offers a dynamic compensation scheme for the manager
to control the building temperature dynamics in a way that maximizes the utility’s profit (or
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minimizes its costs) while maintaining the indoor temperature level within a desirable range. This
idea of indirect load control can be realized by a dynamic contract design method that is capable
of managing engineered systems.
In this study, we propose a method to design a dynamic contract when the agent controls
both the principal’s revenue and an (engineered) system that affect the principal’s utility. The
key advantage of the proposed method is that it is effective for situations in which the principal’s
monitoring capabilities are very limited and thus the principal has partial observations. We will
investigate the specific case in which the principal is not able to monitor the agent’s control or
the state of the engineered system and can only observe the output of her noisy revenue process.
Therefore, the proposed method is useful for systems in which the agent’s privacy is critical or
monitoring the system is costly. The contract that we study is dynamic in the sense that, based
on the observations of her revenue process, the principal dynamically chooses the compensation for
the agent to generate an incentive compatible control, which maximizes the agent’s utility. The
contract is optimal in the sense that the combination of the compensation scheme and the incentive
compatible control strategy maximizes the principal’s utility.
The most relevant work to ours is that of Sannikov [6], in which the contract takes into account
only the principal’s revenue. This study suggests that the agent’s expected future payoff can be
used as a performance index and that an optimal compensation scheme and an incentive compatible
control can be chosen as feedback maps from the index in an infinite horizon setting. In this work,
we consider a dynamic contract in a finite time horizon. We suggest that the agent’s future expected
payoff can help in designing an optimal contract in our setting in which the principal has partial
observations, if the end-time compensation is properly chosen. However, having only the agent’s
future expected payoff is insufficient for designing an optimal contract when an engineered system
also affects the principal’s utility. We thus reformulate the dynamic contract design problem as a
stochastic optimal control of both the agent’s future expected payoff and the engineered system
dynamics. Applying the dynamic programming principle, the value function of the reformulated
problem can be computed as a viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. As
a result, an optimal compensation scheme and incentive compatible control strategy can be written
as feedback maps from both the agent’s expected future payoff and the engineered system state.
A model in which a noisy nonlinear system state is directly observed by the principal is studied
using forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) [7]. This stochastic maximum
principle-based approach is extensively investigated in a recent monograph [8]. [9] also characterizes
optimal contracts using FBSDEs when the agent’s private system is controlled with a separate
variable. However, it does not provide a detailed solution except for special cases in which analytic
solutions are available. A completely different model is studied in [10], in which the agent’s effort
is modeled by a Poisson process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the problem setting in
which a principal makes a contract with an agent who has the authority to control the principal’s
revenue and an (engineered) system, and we discuss the availability of information to the principal.
In Section 3, we characterize the incentive compatibility of the agent’s control in a finite horizon
setting. In Section 4, we formulate the principal’s optimal contract design problem as a stochastic
optimal control problem and show the optimality of the resulting contract. Lastly, the performance
of the proposed dynamic contract is demonstrated with an example of indirect load control in
Section 5.
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Figure 1: Information flow at time t under dynamic contract
2 The Setting
Consider the principal’s revenue process, x := {xt}0≤t≤T , xt ∈ R, and the (engineered) system
process, y := {yt}0≤t≤T , yt ∈ R, that affects the principal’s utility:
dxt = utdt+ σdWt
dyt = f(yt, ut)dt,
(1)
given initial values with σ ∈ R. Here, {Wt}t≥0 is an one-dimensional standard Brownian motion on
a probability space (Ω,F ,P). Let {FWt }t≥0 be the filtration generated by the Brownian motion.
For convenience, we consider a one-dimensional engineered system, but the method proposed in
this study can be applied to any system with multiple dimensions as well. Note that the control
process u := {ut}0≤t≤T affects both the revenue and system processes. The principal wants to hire
an agent to manage both processes. That is, the agent has the authority to determine u, while the
principal does not. It would be ideal for the principal if the agent’s utility and principal’s utility
are the same: the (rational) agent then behaves in a way that maximizes the principal’s utility. In
reality, however, the agent’s utility is not aligned with that of the principal. Therefore, the principal
has to incentivize the agent to be cooperative by providing appropriate compensation.
A contract (pi,C, u∗) between the principal and the agent specifies the real-time compensation
pi := {pit}0≤t≤T , pit ∈ R, the end-time compensation C ∈ R and the recommended control strategy
u∗ := {u∗t }0≤t≤T , u∗t ∈ R. The principal offers the contract at time 0. The agent accepts the
contract if the agent’s expected total payoff is greater than some threshold, called the participation
payoff, assuming that he follows the recommended control strategy. This condition is often called
individual rationality.
If the principal can monitor the agent’s control process, the principal can enforce any u∗ by
imposing a significant penalty (written down in the contract) on the agent when his choice deviates
from u∗. However, monitoring the agent’s effort is not possible (or is costly) in many practical
applications. In addition, we consider a situation in which the principal is not able to (or is not
willing to) monitor the system process y. The principal can only observe her revenue process x, as
shown in Fig. 1. Therefore, the agent is free to deviate from the recommended control (or effort)
level without informing the principal of his deviation. For example, the agent can shirk and then
attribute the resulting low revenue to noise. On the other hand, the agent has perfect observations
of the revenue, system and control processes. Fig. 1 depicts the information flow in our problem
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setting.
Due to her limited monitoring capability and thus partial observations, the principal cannot en-
force an arbitrary recommended control upon the agent: the principal can only enforce an incentive
compatible control, which maximizes the agent’s expected utility given the compensation scheme
in the contract. Therefore, the principal’s best strategy in this setting of asymmetric information
is to choose a compensation scheme such that its incentive compatible control of the agent and the
compensation scheme maximize the principal’s expected utility.
This study uses the following expected payoffs for the principal and agent:
(principal) E
[∫ T
0
(
dxt + r
P (yt, pit)dt
)
+ q(yT )− C
]
,
(agent) E
[∫ T
0
(rA(pit)− h(ut))dt+ g(C)
]
.
Here, rP (yt, pit) and q(yT ) denote the real-time and terminal rewards that the principal obtains.
In addition, h(ut) is the cost for control ut, and r
A(pit) and g(C) denote the utilities coming from
the real-time and end-time compensation, respectively. Note that the agent is indifferent to the
principal’s revenue and the engineered system performance. This utility model of the agent is useful
for the situations in which the principal owns the engineered system (infrastructure). As we will
see in the indirect load control problem in Section 5, using this model is also reasonable when it
is difficult to quantify the agent’s payoff as a function of the system state. We assume that the
principal is risk neutral while the agent is risk averse. Let rA be concave and h be differentiable,
convex and increasing. We also assume that g is a continuous invertible function, which is concave
and strictly increasing. We introduce the sets of feasible control, real-time compensation and end-
time compensation schemes as
U := {u : [0, T ]→ U | u progressively measurable with respect to FWt },
Π := {pi : [0, T ]→ P | pi progressively measurable with respect to Fxt },
C := {C ∈ R | C is FxT -measurable},
respectively, where U and P are compact sets in R and {Fxt }0≤t≤T is the filtration generated
by x. We assume that f : R × U → R is continuous and that there exists L > 0 such that
|f(y1, a)− f(y2, a)| ≤ L|y1 − y2| for all y1, y2 ∈ R and a ∈ U .
3 The Agent’s Incentive Compatible Control
To design the real-time and end-time compensation schemes that are optimal for the principal, we
first characterize a condition in which the agent’s control is incentive compatible. Given the real-
time and end-time compensation, (pi,C), the agent’s incentive compatible control is the solution
of
max
u∈U
Eu
[∫ T
0
(rA(pit)− h(ut))dt+ g(C)
]
,
i.e., any control that is incentive compatible with (pi,C) maximizes the agent’s expected total
utility given (pi,C). Here, the expectation is taken under the probability measure Pu induced by
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the agent’s control u. We introduce a new variable that denotes the agent’s expected future payoff,
i.e.,
wt := Eu
[∫ T
t
(rA(pis)− h(us))dt+ g(C)
∣∣∣∣∣FWt
]
.
Note that the new variable also depends on the end-time compensation, while the one in Sannikov [6]
does not because there is no end-time compensation in the infinite horizon setting of Sannikov. The
dynamics of the agent’s expected future payoff can be written as (2) in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given (pi,C), there exists an {FWt }0≤t≤T -adapted process ξ := {ξt}0≤t≤T (de-
pending on (pi,C, u)) such that
wt = w0 −
∫ t
0
(rA(pis)− h(us))ds+
∫ t
0
ξs(dxs − usds) (2)
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Similar to those in Sannikov [6] and Ekeland [11], the proposition can be proved using the
martingale representation theorem [12]. Proposition 1 allows us to write the dynamics of the
agent’s expected future payoff as the following stochastic differential equation:
dwt = −(rA(pit)− h(ut) + ξtut)dt+ ξtdxt
wT = g(C).
(3)
Even if the agent changes his control level and the system process is changed accordingly, the
principal’s compensation scheme stays unchanged because the principal is not able to observe the
agent’s control strategy or the (engineered) system process. Therefore, the agent has an incentive
to choose his control level that maximizes −h(ut) + ξtut, given (pi,C).
Proposition 2. Let ξ be the {FWt }0≤t≤T -adapted process defined by (2) given (pi,C, u). The control
process u is incentive compatible with (pi,C) if and only if
− h(ut) + ξtut = max
a∈U
{−h(a) + ξta} , t ∈ [0, T ], (4)
almost everywhere.
This proposition can be shown using the argument in [6] and [11] even in our finite time horizon
setting. Note that ξt represents the sensitivity of the agent’s expected future payoff to the principal’s
noisy revenue. Because the agent is risk averse while the principal is risk neutral, they select the
minimum level of ξt such that it makes the recommended control incentive compatible. We denote
this level by θ(ut), which can be expressed as
θ(ut) := min
0≤z<∞
{
z | ut ∈ arg max
a∈U
{−h(a) + za}
}
,
as claimed in [6]. Note that the sensitivity ξt also depends on (pi,C): the risk-neutral principal offers
(pi,C) such that ξt[pi,C, u] = θ(ut) for the risk-averse agent. If h is strictly convex and the principal
chooses a contract (pi,C, u) such that ξt[pi,C, u] = h
′(ut), t ∈ [0, T ], a.e., then the agent’s incentive
compatible control is u, and hence, θ(ut) = ξt[pi,C, u] = h
′(ut). To design such a contract, the
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principal can use the agent’s expected future payoff as a performance index for the agent. However,
the principal needs another performance index for the engineered system because it also affects
her utility. Taking into account both performance indices, the contract design problem can be
formulated as the stochastic optimal control of the agent’s expected future payoff process (3) and
the (engineered) system, as discussed in the following section.
4 The Principal’s Problem: Optimal Dynamic Contract
We now turn our attention to the principal’s problem: she wants to choose real-time and end-time
compensation such that both the compensation scheme and the corresponding agent’s incentive
compatible control (i) maximize the principal’s utility and (ii) make the agent’s total payoff exceed
the participation payoff, b ∈ R. This problem can be formulated as the following optimization:
max
u∈U,pi∈Π,
C∈C
E
[∫ T
0
ut + r
P (yt, pit)dt+ q(yT )− C
]
(5a)
subject to dxt = utdt+ σdWt (5b)
dwt = −(rA(pit)− h(ut) + ξtut)dt+ ξtdxt, t ∈ [0, T ] (5c)
wT = g(C) (5d)
ξt = θ(ut), t ∈ [0, T ], a.e. (5e)
w0 ≥ b (5f)
dyt = f(yt, ut)dt, t ∈ [0, T ] (5g)
y0 = y
0, (5h)
where (5c) and (5d) specify the dynamics of the agent’s expected future payoff, (5e) is the condition
for the agent’s incentive compatible control, and (5f) imposes the individual rationality condition
that the agent’s expected total payoff should exceed the participation payoff. Furthermore, (5g) and
(5h) should be included because the principal’s utility is affected by the state, yt, of the engineered
system.
If w0 > b, then the principal has an incentive to decrease the end-time compensation C because
g is increasing. Therefore, the constraint (5f) can be substituted with w0 = b. Recalling that g is
an invertible function, we reformulate the problem as
max
u∈U,pi∈Π′
E
[∫ T
0
ut + r
P (yt, pit)dt+ q(yT )− g−1(wT )
]
subject to dwt = −(rA(pit)− h(ut))dt+ θ(ut)σdWt, t ∈ [0, T ] (6a)
w0 = b (6b)
dyt = f(yt, ut)dt, t ∈ [0, T ] (6c)
y0 = y
0, (6d)
where Π′ := {pi : [0, T ] → P | pi progressively measurable with respect to FWt } ⊇ Π. We will show
that its solution also solves (5) in Theorem 2. Note that this problem has the form of a standard
stochastic optimal control problem. We can solve this problem using dynamic programming. We
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define the value function of the optimal control as
φ(w,y, t) := max
u∈U,pi∈Π′
JPw,y,t[u, pi],
where
JPw,y,t[u, pi] := Ew,y,t
[∫ T
t
us + r
P (ys, pis)ds+ q(yT )− g−1(wT )
]
.
Here, Ew,y,t[B] denotes the expected value of B conditioned on (wt, yt) = (w,y). The value
function corresponds to the viscosity solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
[13]:
∂φ
∂t
+ max
(p,a)∈P×U
{−(rA(p)− h(a))Dwφ+ f(y, a)Dyφ
+a+ rP (y, p) +
1
2
(θ(a)σ)2D2wφ
}
= 0,
with the terminal condition φ(w,y, T ) = −g−1(w) + q(y). By solving the HJB equation, we
can determine an optimal compensation scheme and an optimal recommended control strategy.
Let (w∗0 , y
∗
0) = (b, y
0). Given an optimal trajectory (w∗s , y
∗
s ) for s ∈ [0, t], an optimal real-time
compensation and a recommended (incentive compatible) control can be obtained as
(pi∗t , u
∗
t ) := arg max
(p,a)∈P×U
{−(rA(p)− h(a))Dwφ(w∗t , y∗t ) + f(y∗t , a)Dyφ(w∗t , y∗t ) + a+ rP (y∗t , p)
+
1
2
(θ(a)σ)2D2wφ(w
∗
t , y
∗
t )
}
and an optimal end-time compensation is computed as
C∗ = g−1(w∗T ).
A more detailed discussion regarding how to synthesize an optimal control from a viscosity solution
of an associated HJB equation can be found in [14] even when the solution φ is not differentiable.
We notice that the optimal compensation and control are Markovian with respect to (w∗t , y
∗
t ).
Therefore, pi∗ must be in Π, which is the original feasible set. Recall that the principal cannot
observe the system process y; thus, it does not seem feasible for the principal to make this contract.
If the agent chooses the recommendation u∗ as his control, however, the principal can infer the
state of the system from its dynamics, i.e.,
dy∗t = f(y
∗
t , u
∗
t )dt
y∗0 = y
0.
Because the differential equation has a unique solution, her inference concerning the state of the
system must be correct. Therefore, the principal has the correct system process information if the
recommended control u∗ is incentive compatible with (pi∗, C∗). In the following theorem, we prove
that the recommended control u∗ is indeed incentive compatible with (pi∗, C∗).
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Theorem 1. Let (u∗, pi∗) be a solution of (6) and C∗ := g−1(w∗T ), where w
∗ is the process driven
by
dw∗t = −(rA(pi∗t )− h(u∗t ))dt+ θ(u∗t )(dxt − u∗t dt)
w∗0 = b.
(7)
Then, u∗ is the agent’s control that is incentive compatible with (pi∗, C∗).
Proof. Given (pi∗, C∗, u∗), the agent’s expected future payoff is driven by
dwt = −(rA(pi∗t )− h(u∗t ) + ξtu∗t )dt+ ξtdxt
wT = g(C
∗),
where ξt = ξt[pi
∗, C∗, u∗]. Due to Proposition 2, u∗ is incentive compatible with (pi∗, C∗) if and only
if θ(u∗t ) = ξt for t ∈ [0, T ], almost everywhere.
Now, we consider the process governed by (7). Because the end-time compensation is chosen as
C∗ = g−1(w∗T ), w
∗
T = g(C
∗), which implies that
w∗T = wT .
Define ψt := wt − w∗t , which then satisfies
dψt = (ξt − θ(u∗t ))σdWu
∗
t
ψT = 0,
where
Wu
∗
t :=
1
σ
(
xt −
∫ t
0
u∗sds
)
is a Brownian motion under the probability measure Pu
∗
. Using the Itoˆ isometry, we have
0 = Eu
∗ [
ψ2T
]
= Eu
∗
[∫ T
0
{(ξt − θ(u∗t ))σ}2dt
]
,
which implies that
ξt = θ(u
∗
t ), t ∈ [0, T ],
almost everywhere. Therefore, u∗ is incentive compatible with (pi∗, C∗) as desired.
We are now ready to show that (pi∗, C∗, u∗) obtained by solving (6) is an optimal contract.
Theorem 2. Let (u∗, pi∗) be a solution of (6) and C∗ := g−1(w∗T ), where w
∗ is the process driven
by (7). Then, (pi∗, C∗, u∗) is an optimal contract, i.e., it solves (5).
Proof. We notice that (pi∗, C∗, u∗) can satisfy all the constraints of (5) because ξt = θ(u∗t ) almost
everywhere (due to Theorem 1) and w∗T = g(C
∗). (Also note that pi∗ ∈ Π and C∗ ∈ C because
(pi∗t , u
∗
t ) is Markovian with respect to (w
∗
t , y
∗
t ).) Suppose that (pi
∗, C∗, u∗) is not a solution of (5),
and choose a solution, (pˆi, Cˆ, uˆ), of (5).
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We first claim that (pˆi, Cˆ, uˆ) satisfies all the constraints of (6) with the process wˆ defined by
dwˆt = −(rA(pˆit)− h(uˆt))dt+ ξt(dxˆt − uˆtdt)
wˆT = g(Cˆ),
where dxˆt = uˆtdt+ σdWt. Because wˆ solves (6a) with pˆit, uˆt and ξt = θ(uˆt) a.e., it suffices to show
that wˆ0 = b. Assume wˆ0 > b. Then, there exists C
′ < Cˆ such that
g(C ′) = g(Cˆ)− (wˆ0 − b)
because g is continuous and increasing. Then, (pˆi, C ′, uˆ) satisfies all the constraints of (5) and is
strictly better than (pˆi, Cˆ, uˆ). This is a contradiction and wˆ0 must be equal to the participation
payoff b. Therefore, (pˆi, Cˆ, uˆ) with wˆ can satisfy all the constraints of (6).
Because (pˆi, Cˆ, uˆ) solves (5) while (pi∗, C∗, u∗) does not, we have
E
[∫ T
0
uˆt + r
P (yˆt, pˆit)dt+ q(yˆT )− g−1(wˆT )
]
> E
[∫ T
0
u∗t + r
P (y∗t , pi
∗
t )dt+ q(y
∗
T )− g−1(w∗T )
]
,
(8)
where dyˆt = f(yˆt, uˆt)dt and dy
∗
t = f(y
∗
t , u
∗
t )dt and yˆ0 = y
∗
0 = y
0. Inequality (8) contradicts the fact
that (pi∗, C∗, u∗) is a solution to (6). Therefore, (pi∗, C∗, u∗) must be a solution of (5) and hence
an optimal contract.
In the contract, the compensation scheme and recommended control are written as feedback
maps of (w∗t , y
∗
t ), which might be different from the actual (wt, yt). However, by offering both the
compensations and the recommended control that is incentive compatible, the principal induces the
agent to have no incentive to deviate from u∗ and (w∗t , y
∗
t ). Therefore, the principal can maximize
her utility with this contract, as expected.
5 Application to Indirect Load Control
We consider a scenario in which an electricity utility company makes a contract that is renewed
daily with an aggregation of its customers to indirectly control the customers’ air conditioners. Let
uit be the power consumption (in kW) by customer i’s air conditioner at time t for i = 1, · · · , N .
We impose an ideal assumption that the customers in the aggregation agree to equally control the
power consumption, i.e., ui ≡ u for i = 1, · · · , N . Then, the total power consumption by the
air conditioners at time t is given by Nut. The authority of control u is given to the customers:
the utility company has no capability to directly control u. Let λt be the balancing price, which
is chosen as the locational marginal price (LMP) of unit power in kW at time t in the real-time
market. We also let ζ be the energy price in the customers’ tariff. Then, the utility company’s
revenue process due to the air conditioners in the real-time market is driven by the following SDE:
dxt = (ζ − λt)Nutdt+ σdWt,
where the diffusion term models the uncertainty introduced by loads other than the air conditioners
or distributed generations. This is a simplified model of the utility’s revenue or saving: we assume
9
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Figure 2: Balancing price or LMP, λt, in the real-time market
that day-ahead purchases are always less than the minimum feasible real-time demand. This is
consistent with existing market structures, e.g., the California ISO’s. Therefore the utility company
must always purchase some amount of electricity in real time. A more detailed revenue model in
the real-time market will be studied in the future.
If the utility company offers a contract without taking into account the customers’ indoor tem-
peratures and the aggregation of customers accepts it, the customers may experience uncomfortable
indoor temperatures during the contract period and choose not to enter a contract with the util-
ity company again. There are two major ways for the utility company to take into account the
customers’ indoor temperatures in the contract:
1. the utility company can design a contract assuming that the customers’ payoff functions also
depend on their indoor temperatures;
2. the utility company can choose a compensation scheme that incentivizes the customers to
maintain their indoor temperatures within [y, y].
Although the first approach seems to be more natural, it requires quantifying the customers’ payoff
as a function of the indoor temperature: if the utility company underestimates or overestimates the
customers’ value of their indoor temperatures, the recommended control specified in the contract
is no longer incentive compatible. The second approach is feasible because the utility company
has a clear incentive to take into account the customers’ indoor temperatures to make the contract
desirable enough for the customers to enter into the contract every day. It does not even require
modeling the payoff of the customer as a function of the indoor temperature.
In this example, we use the second approach. Let yit be the customer i’s indoor temperature at
time t. We assume that the outdoor temperature profile {Θt}0≤t≤T is given. Then, the customer
i’s indoor temperature process can be modeled as
dyit = [αi(Θt − yit)− κiuit]dt,
for some positive constant κ that converts an increase in energy (kWh) to a reduction in temperature
(◦C). More detailed explanation of this equivalent thermal parameter model can be found in [15, 16].
If we assume that αi ≡ α, κi ≡ κ and yi0 ≡ y0 for i = 1, · · · , N , then the indoor temperatures for
all customers have the same dynamics, i.e., yt := y
i
t, i = 1, · · · , N .
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Figure 3: (a) Indirectly controlled indoor temperature, and (b) incentive compatible control of each
customer.
We model the customers’ total cost function as the energy cost for operating their air condi-
tioners, i.e.,
h(ut) =
N∑
i=1
ζuit = ζNut.
Recall that ζ is the energy price in the customers’ tariff. The utility company cares about the
customers’ indoor temperature level as well as the compensation that it should transfer to the
customers. We therefore model the utility company’s running reward as
rP (yt, pit) = −η1
[
exp(η2(yt − y)) + exp(η2(y − yt))
]− pit
for some positive constants η1 and η2, assuming the utility company wants to maintain the indoor
temperature within the range, [y, y], chosen by the customers when writing the contract.
Once the aggregation of customers receives the real-time compensation, pit, from the utility
company, we assume that the customers agree to share it equally. That is, the compensation that
customer i receives is piit =
1
N pit =: p¯it. The total payoff of the aggregation of customers for the
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real-time compensation from the utility company can be modeled as rA(pit) = Np¯it = pit. Similarly,
we set g(C) := C.
We set the contract period as the period from 10am to 6pm and choose N = 1000, i.e., there
are 1000 customers in the aggregation. The total participation payoff is selected as b = −0.1N ,
i.e., each individual’s expected payoff is −$0.1. The real-time balancing price that we use is given
in Fig. 2. We use y = 22.5, y = 18, y0 = 22.5, σ = 200, ζ = 0.2, η1 = 10, η2 = 5 and κ = 1 in the
simulation. We also set U := {0, 2} for ON/OFF control of air conditioners and set P := [0, 0.2].
The incentive compatible control obtained using the proposed method is shown in Fig. 3 (b).
We notice that each customer turns on his or her air conditioner to do pre-cooling in the early
morning. Fig. 2 shows that the balancing price in the real-time market is low in the morning
but has a peak at about 4pm. Therefore, it is beneficial for the utility company if each customer
uses his or her air conditioner in the morning when the balancing price is low and does not use
it much when the price is high. Because the compensation induces the desired behavior of the
customer, we can see that the dynamic contract is appropriately designed. Fig. 3 (a) shows the
indoor temperature controlled by the customer. As desired, the indoor temperature stays within
the temperature range [y, y]. More specifically, it decreases a little in the morning (pre-cooling) but
keeps slightly increasing after 11am due to the incentive compatible control shown in Fig. 3 (a).
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed a dynamic contract design method when the agent has the authority to control both
the principal’s revenue and an engineered system while the principal has no capability of monitoring
the agent’s control of the state of the engineered system. We showed that Sannikov’s idea of using
the agent’s future expected payoff as a state variable is useful even in our (more general) setting in
which the principal has partial observations if the end-time compensation is chosen appropriately
and the engineered system is tracked as another index of the agent’s performance. By reformulating
the contract design problem as a stochastic optimal control problem, we numerically solved the
problem using the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The performance and usefulness
of the proposed method were demonstrated by an indirect load control problem.
In the future, we plan to propose a resilient contract in a more general setting. Furthermore,
the application of the proposed method to indirect load control problems should be considered
under more realistic assumptions by introducing the heterogeneity of customers and using detailed
real-time market with price dynamics.
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